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IS IGNORANCE OF FACT AN EXCUSE ONLY 
FOR THE VIRTUOUS? 
Dan M. Kahan* 
Professor Yeager's thoughtful response to my essay has con­
vinced me that there is indeed a connection worth noting between 
the mistake of law doctrine and the mistake of fact doctrine. 
Yeager suggests that my position on mistake of law reduces to the 
view that someone who would be guilty of a "lesser wrong" were 
things as he perceived them to be may be punished for the "greater 
wrong" that he actually commits - a conception of mistake of fact 
that has provoked fierce denunciation from commentators. But I 
would in fact put things slightly differently: under both doctrines 
courts excuse a mistaken offender when, but only when, the of­
fender's mistake negates the inference that he has failed to internal­
ize society's moral norms. 
Regina v. Prince1 is an excellent example. The "elopement" 
statute in that case made it a crime for a man to "take . . . any 
unmarried girl, being under the age of sixteen years, out of the pos­
session and against the will of her father or mother."2 Against the 
background of the traditional moral norms that gave rise to the 
statute, the critical element was not the age of the female but the 
absence of consent from the parents; the statute was much more 
concerned with protecting the "possessory rights" of fathers, who 
historically had negotiated the betrothal of their daughters in ex­
change for various kinds of commercial, social, and political bene­
fits,3 than it was with protecting teenage females from sexual 
predation.4 Thus, the court tells us, a man who took an unemanci-
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B.A. 1986, Middlebury; J.D. 
1989, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to the Russell J. Parsons and Jerome S. Weiss Faculty 
Research Funds at the University of Chicago Law School for generous financial support, and 
to Jason Fliegel for proficient research assistance. 
1. 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875). 
2. Offenses against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Viet., ch. 100, 55 (Eng.), cited in Prince, 
2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. at 154 n.1. 
3. See SUSAN STAVES, MARruEo WOMEN'S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN ENGLAND, 1660-
1833, at 117-18 (1990). 
4. See, e.g., Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. at 172 (Blackbum, J.) (observing that sixteenth­
century precursor to statute "recognizes a legal right to the possession of the child"); Prince 
at 178-79 (Denman, J.) ("Her father had a right to her personal custody up to the age of 
twenty-one, and to appoint a guardian by deed or will, whose right to her personal custody 
would have extended up to the same age."). 
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pated "girl" he knew to be eighteen years old out of the possession 
of her parents without the father's consent was just as bad, morally 
speaking, as a man who ran off with a girl he knew to be fourteen, 
for both could be deemed to have "trespassed on the father's 
rights."5 Consequently, the court reasoned, it made no sense to ex­
cuse a man who made a mistake as to whether the girl was fourteen 
or eighteen.6 But what about a man who mistakenly believed that 
he had the consent of the father to take a girl he knew to be only 
fourteen? Depending on the circumstances, there might be reason 
to think of him as careless, but he could not be seen as having repu­
diated the norm of paternal proprietorship. And accordingly, 
Baron Bramwell tells us, he would have had a mistake of fact 
defense.7 
This analysis generalizes. When the fact in question marks the 
boundary line between socially approved behavior and socially dis­
approved behavior, courts will likely deem a mistake as to that fact 
to be a defense. Whether an object that one picks up from the 
ground is someone else's property or instead an abandoned piece of 
junk, for example, can mark the boundary line between culpable 
misappropriation and valuable salvaging; so if someone makes a 
mistake about that fact, he is afforded a defense to theft.8 But 
when, in contrast, a fact doesn't mark that moral boundary line -
when even the offender's own understanding of his behavior situ­
ates him firmly within the interior of what society deems immoral 
- then courts will not afford him an excuse despite his ignorance. 
Whether someone is a federal officer or instead a private citizen, 
for example, has no bearing on the moral appropriateness of as­
saulting that person; for that reason, a mistake about the victim's 
identity is no defense to a charge of assaulting a law enforcement 
officer.9 
5. Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. at 170-72 (Blackburn, J.). 
6. See Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. at 171-72 (Blackbum, J.); Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 
at 174 (Bramwell, B.); Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. at 179 (Denman, J.). 
7. See Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. at 175 (Bramwell, B.). 
8. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952); United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 {1978) (permitting a mistake defense as to facts that mark 
boundary between legitimate market behavior and price fixing); cf. United States v. Nofziger, 
878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1989) {allowing a mistake defense on the facts that separate legiti­
mate political lobbying from "revolving door" influence peddling). 
9. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 685 (1975); cf. United States v. Yermian, 468 
U.S. 63, 75 {1984) (holding that a person who knowingly makes false or fraudulent statement 
is not entitled to mistake defense relating to whether recipient of the misrepresentation is the 
federal government rather than private actor); State v. Gilmour, 522 N.W.2d 595 (Iowa 1994) 
(denying defense as to age of female in production of child pornography), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 1066 {1998). 
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This account of the mistake of fact doctrine does indeed connect 
it to my account of the mistake of law doctrine.10 Courts confine 
both types of mistake defenses to actors who have internalized 
community moral norms: if the defendant would be acting consist­
ently with those norms were circumstances - factual and legal -
as she supposed them to be, she gets a defense; if not, not. Both 
ignorance of fact and ignorance of law, then, are indeed excuses 
only for the virtuous.11 
Under this formulation, neither doctrine is subject to the criti­
cism that it conflates actors who commit "lesser" wrongs with those 
who commit "greater" ones. The court in Prince didn't view elop­
ing with an unemancipated eighteen-year-old as a lesser, albeit suf­
ficient, wrong; rather it regarded what Prince thought he was doing 
as just as wrong as eloping with a girl he knew to be fourteen.12 The 
same goes for those denied a mistake of law defense: Marrero was 
just as bad as any person who knew he was violating the firearms 
statute; if anything, his self-conscious attempt to loophole could be 
considered a morally aggravating factor.13 
Why do critics of Prince even suggest that someone who acts in 
ignorance of a factual element of a crime must be acting "less" 
wrongfully than someone who was aware of all the facts? The an­
swer is that they are assuming a variant of liberal positivism,14 
which insists that the law appraise a person's culpability exclusively 
by the standard of conduct reflected in positive law and without 
recourse to extralegal moral understandings.15 In my essay, I tried 
10. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 
HARv. L. REv. 469, 478-79 (1996). 
11. There can, of course, be middle ground cases in which the actor is mistaken about a 
fact that marks the boundary line not between socially desirable and socially undesirable 
conduct, but rather between types of undesirable conduct that vary in their degree of moral 
reprehensibility. In these types of cases, we might see courts allowing an incomplete mistake 
of fact defense such that the offender is convicted only of the lesser crime that he'd be guilty 
of were circumstances as he supposed them to be. See, e.g., Regina v. CUnningham, 2 Q.B. 
396 (1957). For this reason, we might say that mistakes are a complete defense only for the 
virtuous but might still be a partial defense for offenders who, as a result of their mistakes, 
aren't as vicious as those who commit their offenses knowingly. 
12. See Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. at 175 (Bramwell, B.) ("[W]hat the statute contem­
plates, and what I say is wrong, is the taking of a female of such tender years that she is 
properly called a girl . .. "); Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. at 179 (Denman, J.) ("He had 
wrongfully done the very thing contemplated by the legislature."). 
13. See People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of 
Law Is an Excuse- but Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REv. 127, 141-42 (1997) (discuss­
ing case). 
14. See Kahan, supra note 13, at 127-28. 
15. See, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw: THE GENERAL PART 190 (2d ed. 
1961) ("The legislature has decided that it is only in the case of girls under sixteen that the act 
is so serious as to be made a criminal offence. Why should Prince's knowledge [i.e., belief] 
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to show why liberal positivism furnishes an uncompelling basis for 
criticizing the selective allowance of a mistake of law defense. It 
furnishes no more compelling a basis for criticizing courts' decisions 
to consult community moral norms in deciding whether or not mis­
takes of fact should excuse. 
Start with individual desert. Just as our intuitions don't always 
make blameworthiness depend on an individual's knowledge of the 
existence of a legal prohibition, so they don't always make it de­
pend on his knowledge of every matter of fact that may be relevant 
to such a prohibition. Thus, no matter how the statute is worded, it 
simply isn't the case that someone who assaults a federal officer 
believing him to be "merely" a private citizen is less deserving of 
condemnation - or simply deserving of less - than someone who 
knows his victim is a federal officer. 
From a deterrence point of view, too, it makes sense to afford a 
mistake of fact defense only when the fact marks the moral bound­
ary line. Strict liability can "overdeter": when even reasonable 
mistakes do not excuse, some uncertain actors will refrain from en­
gaging in borderline conduct that actually lies outside the reach of 
the law out of fear that they might be misapprehending the real 
facts. When such a fact sits on the boundary line between morally 
desirable and morally undesirable behavior, this "chilling effect" is 
bad, for in that case the forgone conduct would have generated licit 
utility: society loses out if a nervous salvager refrains· from picking 
up what is truly abandoned junk because he worries that it might be 
deemed someone else's property.16 However, when the fact in 
question does not sit on the moral boundary line, but is actually 
located within the interior of what's immoral, then the chilling effect 
of strict liability is good because any utility from the forgone activ­
ity would have been illicit: if a nervous mugger refrains from as-
that he was committing the lesser moral wrong [of eloping with an 18 year old] make him 
guilty of this crime?"). 
16. Cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978) ("The impo· 
sition of criminal liability on a corporate official, or for that matter on a corporation directly, 
for engaging in such conduct which only after the fact is determined to violate the statute 
because of anticompetitive effects, without inquiring into the intent with which it was under­
taken, holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence; salutary and procompetitive con­
duct lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen 
who chose to be excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to 
criminal punishment for even a good-faith error of judgment."); United States v. Nofziger, 
878 F.2d 442, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (allowing mistake of fact defense for unlawful lobbying 
because of potential of "strict liability" to "chill[] speech": "[I]f the government's interpreta· 
tion of [the statute] were correct, a prudent man would avoid even permissible lobbying of 
his former agency within one year of his departure because the existence of an unsuspected 
direct and substantial agency interest could convert what he believed to be a permissible 
co=unication into a felony."). 
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saulting a private citizen because he fears that the person could be a 
law-enforcement official, all the better from society's point of 
view.17 
Of course, all of this might be thought to underscore the force of 
Yeager's second criticism of my essay, namely, that it neglects to 
spell out the moral norms that ought to inform the mistake doc­
trines. Before we sign on to the view that an excuse is due only 
when a mistaken offender has internalized community moral 
norms, shouldn't we come up with an acceptable theory of what 
those norms should be? Don't we need such a theory, at a mini­
mum, to deal with hard cases, in which there is community dissen­
sus over moral norms? Is a person who mistakenly believes that he 
possessed only a semi-automatic rifle and not a prohibited fully au­
tomatic one nevertheless violating community norms?18 How 
about a man who has intercourse with a seventeen-year-old believ­
ing her to be eighteen? In our day, is the age element of statutory 
rape a moral boundary-line fact?19 Assuming strict liability for stat­
utory rape discourages nervous men from having casual sexual rela­
tions with women who are in fact eighteen or nineteen years old, is 
that a "good" or a "bad" chilling effect from society's point of 
view? 
I'm afraid I'm going to have to disappoint Professor Yeager 
once more by declining to answer these questions. Of course, I 
have a position on the contentious moral issues underlying the mis­
take cases, and of course I want the law to get it right on these 
issues. I just happen to think there's a better way for legal academ­
ics to improve the law than to hold themselves forth as authorita­
tive appraisers of society's norms. Morally preachy law review 
articles can't really make society better; only political organizing 
can. One impediment to organizing, however, is that morally defec­
tive legal decisions frequently cloak themselves in mystifying ab­
stractions (like liberal positivism) that deprive members of the 
17. Cf. Gilmour v. Rogerson, 117 F.3d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding "chilling effect" in 
form of "the reluctance to use young-looking models in sexually explicit adult pornography" 
supplies no reason to allow mistake of fact defense as to age of minor in child pornography 
offense), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998). 
18. Compare Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 614-15 (1994) (characterizing posses­
sion with such belief as "entirely innocent") with Staples, 511 U.S. at 633 (Stevens, J., dissent­
ing) ("The 'character and nature' of such a weapon is sufficiently hazardous to place the 
possessor on notice of the possibility of regulation."). 
19. See generally Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to 
Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R. 5TH 499 (1997) (recognizing that strict 
liability remains the majority rule but that a growing number of states now permit a reason­
able mistake defense). 
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public of a salient focal point for democratic deliberation.20 Now 
it's at least conceivable that what legal academics write in law jour­
nals, and even more plausibly what they teach in law school class­
rooms, can persuade judges to speak in a morally transparent rather 
than a morally opaque doctrinal idiom. And if legal academics can 
do that, then they will be making a real contribution to the project 
of making the law just. 
20. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 362-65, 373-74 (1996). 
